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A MAP ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES
AIRLINE COMPETITION'
By EDWARD J. TAAFFE
Assistant Professor of Geography, Northwestern University
PART II - COMPETITION AND GROWTH
N the first part of this study2 the development of airline competition
among the 99 leading city pairs3 was portrayed in a series of maps.
In part the purpose of the first article was to provide a clear picture of
individual route competition in the broader competitive setting of the
leading city pairs; in part, it was to determine meaningful competitive
categories for the evaluation of the relation between competition and
growth. From the map examination it was evident that a consideration
of prewar to postwar growth involved such sweeping competitive change
as to render it of questionable significance as a study period. Of the
other two periods represented on the competitive maps, 1949-1954
was a period of competitive stability, 1954-1956 was a period of
competitive change associated with the initial impact of the recent
round of CAB decisions. If one considered 10 per cent competition
as effective competition, the 100 city pairs could be divided into one-,
two- and three-carrier pairs. 4 Those pairs which had no single-carrier
service were grouped with the one-carrier pairs; those which had more
than three effective competitors were grouped with the three-carrier
pairs.
In this second part of the study, the growth pattern of the 99 city
pairs is mapped both for the period of competitive stability and the
1 Both Part I and Part II of this study represent some preliminary findings
of an empirical investigation of the traffic characteristics of the leading city pairs.
The investigation is being carried on in connection with a Transportation Center
study of CAB regulatory policy. Any conclusions are, of course, quite tentative in
nature. It is hoped, however, that this cartographic and tabular presentation will
act as a stimulus to communication from airline research and traffic personnel
regarding more detailed and realistic interpretation of the growth and competitive
characteristics of individual routes.
2 Edward J. Taaffe, "A Map Analysis of United States Airline Competition-
Part I: The Development of Competition," JOURNAL op AIR LAW AND COMMERCE,
XXV, (Spring, 1958) pp. 121-147.
3 As is discussed in Taaffe, op. cit., p. 122, only 99 of the 100 leading city pairs
are mapped. Tampa-Chicago and St. Petersburg-Chicago, both of which were
included among the 100 leading pairs in March, 1956, are considered as a single pair.
4 Although the ten per cent definition has been used by Gill and Bates and
others, its arbitrary nature should be noted at the outset. As a partial compensation
for this, some of the findings in this study are also checked against a five per cent
definition. Even this has serious weaknesses, however. A carrier may be quite
inactive over a route and still, by its very existence, constitute a potential threat
which may have an effect on the other carriers which is indistinguishable from the
effects of an active competitor. The definition of competition for purposes of evalu-
ating its growth effects becomes even more difficult when one considers that the
anticipation of possible competition may also cause a carrier with a monopoly
route to behave like a competitor. This is particularly true of a period of route
awards such as 1955-1956.
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period of competitive change. Each of these patterns will be examined,
first, to determine principal growth factors, then for evidences of sig-
nificant differences in growth between one-, two-, and three-carrier
pairs after adjustments have been made to modify these growth factors.
Differences in percentages of coach travel will also be examined for
evidences of relation to number of competitors. Finally, the city pairs
which experienced an increase in the number of effective competitors
will be mapped separately and their growth rates compared with those
of the city pairs which did not experience an increase in effective com-
petition.
In some respects, therefore, this study is similar to the'previous
studies cited.5 The findings in these were essentially negative in regard
to any relationship between growth and competition. An important
difference in this study, however, is the fact that it covers the period
after 1949 when the initiation of coach services added a new dimension
to airline competition. In addition, explicit attempts will be made to
eliminate Florida traffic, to modify the length-of-haul factor, and to note
other possible complicating factors by observing pertinent growth rates
in the map context of the 99 city pairs.
Traffic Growth from 1949 to 1954
Figure 1 presents the growth in air traffic over each of the 99 city
pairs from 1949 to 1954. The base map is the same as that used in the
article dealing with the development of competition.6 Each circle on
the New York inset, for instance, represents the 1956 passenger-miles
between New York and that city graded into three magnitude cate-
gories. Of the 99 leading city pairs in March, 1956, all but 12 are
represented by the circles on the New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and
Miami maps. These twelve are represented by squares. On the Chicago
inset, the squares represent Washington traffic, on the Los Angeles
inset they represent San Francisco traffic and on the Miami inset they
represent Tampa traffic.
The red and the black-and-white patterns in the circles represent
percentage rates of growth. The histogram-legend in the lower left hand
corner presents a frequency distribution of the 99 growth rates. The
5 Frederick W. Gill and Gilbert L. Bates, Airline Competition, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1949) ; Herbert H. Whitehead, "Effects of Competition
and Changes in Route Structure on Growth of Domestic Air Travel," JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, XVIII (Winter, 1951), pp. 78-90; Harold D. Koontz,
"Domestic Airline Self-Sufficiency: A Problem of Route Structure," American
Economic Review, XLII (March, 1952), pp. 103-125; Gilbert L. Bates, "Current
Changes in Trunkline Competition," JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, XXII,
(Autumn, 1955) pp. 379-405.
6 For a thorough discussion of this base map, see Taaffe, op. cit., pages 123-125.
All data represent two-way traffic and were again drawn from Civil Aeronautics
Board, Airline Traffic Survey, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, and Air Transport Association, Origination-Destination Airline Revenue
Passenger Survey, Airline Finance and Accounting Conference, Washington, D. C.
March and September totals were used in all cases. In the case of 1949 to 1954
growth rates, the 1954 figures were corrected by a factor of 2.21 to allow for differ-
ences in survey periods. The author wishes to express his thanks to John T. Hoare,
graduate student in geography, for cartographic assistance.





Figure 1 -Percentage Increase in Air Traffic from March and September,
1949 to March and September, 1954
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shaded category is approximately centered on the mean; 7 the red cate-
gories represent growth rates greater than average; the black-and-white
categories represent below-average growth rates. Each bar in the legend
represents roughly one-half a standard deviation. Note that there are
a number of high-increase bars on the red open-end category, which
represents growth rates above 241 per cent. As growth rates increase
from the average, the red pattern becomes more intense, from dots, to
lines, to solid color; as growth rates decrease, the black-and-white
patterns become less intense, from cross-hatches, to line, to dots. Thus,
on the Chicago inset, the shading in the Boston circle indicates that
the Boston-Chicago growth rate fell in the average category from 121
to 160.5 per cent; the line pattern in the Boston square indicated that
Boston-Washington traffic fell in the first category below that of the
average (roughly between and 3 of standard deviation below the
mean).
The most conspicuous features of Figure 1 are the high rates of
increase noted at the Florida resorts and at the long-haul cities. Air
passenger traffic to the Florida resorts increased at a phenomenal rate
from 1949 to 1954. Miami, Tampa, and other Florida city pairs had
an average rate of increase of 288 per cent, more than twice the 136
per cent increase for all domestic traffic. There were eight growth rates
greater than 325 per cent among the 99 city pairs. One of these was the
Los Angeles-Las Vegas route; all of the rest were on the Miami-Tampa
map. Growth in Florida traffic seemed to be distributed among north-
ern cities with little concern for the presence of single-carrier services
or the effectiveness of coach services offered.8 High rates of increase will
be noted at cities with no coach service (Indianapolis, Columbus, and
Hartford), with no single-carrier service (Minneapolis), and with
neither single-carrier nor effective coach service (Buffalo). It is also
interesting to note that the very highest growth rates (those above 300
per cent) in Florida traffic were not recorded at the high density,
relatively long-established New York and Chicago routes (see New
York and Chicago insets) but at such other American Manufacturing
Belt cities as Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia. At
some of these cities markedly better services had been initiated during
the period.9 The higher and more consistent Florida increases sets them
clearly apart from the Arizona and California increases, which may also
be associated with resort travel. For most purposes of this study, there-
7 More accurately, the shaded pattern is centered on the mean for the 75 non-
Florida pairs. The red-dotted category is centered on the mean for the entire 99
city pairs. Table 1 in the appendix lists the values for each of these categories as
well as growth rates, coach percentages and number of ten per cent competitors
for each of the 99 pairs.
8 Coach percentages for each city pair are included in Table 1 in the appendix.
These figures were added to work maps to facilitate analysis, but, as will be noted
from the tables, their relation to growth was too weak to justify inclusion on final
maps.
9 It should also be noted, however, that this is, in part, related to the problem
of comparing percentage changes of quantities which have a fairly wide range of
magnitude.
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fore, the 24 pairs involving Florida traffic will be excluded from con-
sideration. In many instances, the Los Angeles-Las Vegas traffic will
also be excluded.
The relatively greater growth of long-haul than of short-haul cities
is evident in the general tendency for the shaded (average) and red
(above-average) patterns to predominate on each inset map as distance
increases from the city concerned. This tendency is emphasized by the
curved lines on the map which represent the 500 and the 1,000-mile
distance zones. The dotted lines, representing the 1,000-mile zone,
serve as a rough boundary between the high and the low growth rates
(see the Miami and Los Angeles maps). Long-haul California traffic
experienced particular growth. The 33 city pairs which include Cali-
fornia traffic had an average rate of growth of 189 per cent, compared
to the total growth of 136 per cent. The over-all correlation between
length of haul and rate of growth was measured by simple linear regres-
sion. The result was a correlation coefficient of .40 (excluding the
Florida resort routes) which tested as significant but only accounted
statistically for 16 per cent of the variation.'0
Table 1 presents another view of this relationship.






It will be noted that there is a fairly regular progression of average
rates of increase with broad distance zones. The slight drop-off from
the 1500-2000 mile zone to the over-2000 mile zone is probably asso-
ciated with slight differentials in growth between some of the long-haul,
high-increase California routes. Many routes departed markedly from
this progression as is clear from the map. New York routes to Cleveland
and Dayton, as well as Chicago routes to Boston and Philadelphia are
examples of average or high-increase, short-haul routes. New York
routes to New Orleans, the Texas cities and Tucson are low increase,
long-haul examples, as are Los Angeles routes to Kansas City and Texas.
A third possible growth factor is represented by the percentage of
coach passengers on each route, as listed in Table I in the appendix.
The percentage of coach passengers on a given route should be related
to both the amount and the effectiveness of coach services offered.
Routes which have a large number of coach flights scheduled at con-
venient hours would presumably have a considerably higher proportion
of coach passengers than comparable routes with coach flights scheduled
10 In the absence of precedents it is difficult to say whether such a coefficient
is really relatively low as it would appear. Cross-section analyses of growth rates
on individual routes might be expected to be quite erratic and such a coefficient
might actually be high. Such haphazard factors as bad weather, conventions, etc.
probably have considerable impact on the two-week survey period. The use of
correlation measures in this instance is less as an index of closeness of relationship
than as an expedient to facilitate comparison.
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at inconvenient hours. Thus, we might expect a positive relationship
between growth rates and percentage of coach passengers. Inspection
of Table 1 in the appendix indicates that this relationship is quite
weak. Regression analysis gives a correlation coefficient of .23 which is
significant at the five per cent level but not at the one per cent level."
Among the many exceptions to a relationship between growth and
coach percentages are the high rates on Dayton and on Cleveland routes
as well as on the Los Angeles-Denver route. Quite a few routes show
low growth rates despite high coach fares, such as those to Kansas City
and some of those to the Arizona resorts.
Thus, it appears that there are two factors significantly related to
differential growth in air travel among the 99 city pairs-resort travel
and length of haul. Neither of these are directly related to competition.
It is probable, therefore, that the great air traffic growth from 1949 to
1954 is related to a basic change in American travel habits so sweeping
as to render difficult the relation of growth differentials to explicit CAB
policy regarding competition. For purposes of analysis, it is fortunate
that a third possible factor, coach service, is less clearly significant since
it should bear some relation to competition. Elimination of coach
effects would therefore carry with it the risk of eliminating some com-
petitive effects.
The first step in an attempt to isolate possible effects of competition
is to eliminate the 24 Florida city pairs and separate the remaining city
pairs onto three groups of maps, showing one-, two-, and three-carrier
pairs (Figure 2). The growth categories are the same as in Figure 1.
The resulting visual impression is that there is no strikingly consistent
tendency for growth rates to increase from left to right. What tendency
there is seems to be associated with the concentration of high-increase
California traffic on the three-carrier map. A progression in growth
rates does show up, however. The one-carrier pairs had an average
growth rate of 129 per cent, the two-carrier pairs had an average of
133 per cent, and the three-carrier pairs had a high average of 207
per cent. This last, however, included an extremely high figure for
Los Angeles-Las Vegas traffic which possibly should have been excluded
in view of its similarity to the Florida resort traffic. The average without
Lqs Angeles-Las Vegas for the three carrier pairs was 175 per cent. The
difference between the categories was tested by use of analysis of
variance. This consists of a comparison of the variation between groups
with the variation within groups. Is the difference in average growth
rates between the one-, two- and three-carrier pairs, for instance, a
difference which might occur merely by chance in view of the amount
of variation in growth rates which still exists within each of these
categories? The between-group and within-group estimates of variation
are then expressed as a ratio and referred to probability tables. The
11 That is, a coefficient of such magnitude could be obtained purely by chance
one time in one hundred even though no relationship actually existed.
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greater the between-group variance estimate relative to the within-
group estimate the higher the ratio and the less likely it is that the
difference in means between the groups is due merely to chance. In
this case the resulting "F" ratio (3.74) tested as significant at the five
Figure 2 - Percentage Increase for 1949-1954 Traffic Grouped According to
Number of Competitors
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per cent level (3.13) but not at the one per cent level (4.92) .12 When
the Los Angeles-Las Vegas route was excluded, however, the F ratio
was appreciably below both the five and the one per cent levels.13
Similar results were obtained from tests utilizing a five per cent share
of the market as the criterion for effective competition so as to reduce
possible distortions associated with the arbitrary ten per cent definition.
Thus, if one were to exclude Los-Angeles-Las Vegas on the ground
that it is clearly a resort pair, the separation of non-resort pairs into
three groups according to the number of effective competitors did not
separate high and low growth rates in any statistically significant
fashion, although the progression in average growth rates should cer-
tainly be noted.
Since coach services also may have some relation to traffic growth,
it is of some interest to investigate the relationship between coach
services and competition. One would expect the percentage of coach
service to increase with the number of competitors. However, even
the averages fail to bear this out. The one-carrier pairs had an average
rate of 29 per cent coach passengers, a figure actually higher than the
27 per cent recorded for the two-carrier pairs. Three-carrier pairs had
an average of 37 per cent. The use of analysis of variance on these data
indicated that differences were not significant either between all three
groups or between the two- and three-carrier groups. This may indicate,
at least tentatively, that decisions to introduce effective coach fares are
more affected by the nature of the traffic, length of haul, particular
airlines concerned, etc., than by the number of competitors.14
The next step in the evaluation of growth rates is to attempt to
modify the complicating factor of length of haul. The variation within
the groups may be due to differences in length of haul which conceiv-
ably might obscure an actually close relationship between growth and
number of competitors. The scatter diagram in Figure 3 represents an
attempt to modify this factor. The regression line represents the weak
average relationship between traffic growth and length of haul. Dots
located above the line represent routes on which growth has been
12 As applied to random sampling, this would mean that a figure as high as
3.13 could be obtained purely by chance in five out of one hundred trials even
though there were no significant differences between the groups; a figure as high
as 4.92 would be obtained only once in one hundred trials. One might regard this
example as a case wherein the hypothesis under examination is that the one-, two-,
and three-carrier growth rates could represent samples from the same statistical
universe. Low ratios mean that this hypothesis might be accepted and that the
groupings according to number of competitors does not result in any greater differ-
ence in means than would be expected from normal sampling error. Certain diffi-
culties involved in applying this measure to non-random samples indicate that the
terms "significant" and "insignificant" are relative and should be accepted with
considerable caution. Here too, however, the device is considered as a useful aid
to precise comparison in that it provides a numerical check on the evaluation of
between-group variation by weighing it against remaining within-group variation.
13 When the Los Angeles-Las Vegas route is included, the variance of the three
groups is non-homogeneous so the size of the ratio is not traceable entirely to differ-
ences in the means. When this route is excluded, however, the requirement of
homogeneity of variance is met.
14 TWA's emphasis on coach services, for instance, shows up in the high coach
percentages on many important TWA pairs.
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Figure :3 - Regression of Growth on Length of Haul, 1949-1954
greater than expected from the average relationship between length
of haul and growth; dots below the line indicate growth which has
been less than expected from this relationship. The residual variations
as represented by the position of the dots have been categorized into
three groups according to competitors. The red dots represent three-
carrier routes; the blank dots represent one-carrier routes. Visual
inspection of the scatter suggests a slight improvement in the relation
of growth to competition, although there is still by no means a consis-
tent grouping of three-carrier dots above the line or one-carrier dots
below the line.
Figure 4 represents the spatial distribution of these residual varia-
tions. The legend categories are similar to those on the growth map.
The shaded category represents those dots (city pairs) which are clus-
tered close to the regression line; the red patterns represent dots well
above the line (city pairs with a greater growth rate than would be
expected from that length of haul) ; the light, black-and-white patterns
represent dots well below the line.'5 Note how the distance effect has
15 Each category is approximately one-half a standard error of estimate in
width. The categories are as follows:
red: +101 or more
red lines: + 61 to +100
red dots: ± 21 to + 60
shading: + 20 to - 20
cross-hatch: - 21 to - 60
lines: - 61 to -100
dots: -101 or less
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been modified, particularly on the New York and Chicago insets. Closer
examination of some of the highs on this map indicates the multiple
product nature of air transportation as it is reflected in the many specific
institutional factors associated with growth. The Las Vegas-Los Angeles
Figure 4 - Residual Deviations from a Regression of Growth on Length of
Haul, 1949-1954
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route is obviously set apart from the others and ranks with the Florida
resort routes in the degree of increase. Dayton traffic on both the New
York and the Los Angeles maps is of such magnitude as to indicate the
influence of Air Force activities at Wright Field. San Diego traffic on
the New York and Chicago maps is high because of the large number
Figure 5 - Residual Deviations from a Regression of Growth on Length of
Haul Grouped According to Number of Competitors, 1949-1954
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of servicemen utilizing the commercial airlines. Philadelphia traffic
growth may be related to improvements in local facilities and services.
Specific institutional factors such as airline equipment problems or
severe rail competition may also be related to the lows on the map as
possibly in the case of Minneapolis-St. Paul traffic to Chicago as well
as to New York. It is also interesting to note that California traffic in
general seems to show greater growth than would be expected from
the average relationship between growth and length of haul. Here too,
there is some evidence of the pattern noted on the Florida map. Los
Angles traffic to New York and Chicago seem to be increasing less
rapidly than that to other Manufacturing Belt cities.
Figure 5 presents these residual variations separated onto three
maps according to number of competitors. If the hypothesis of a rela-
tionship between growth and number of competitors is correct, there
should be a noticeable progression from low to high residuals as one
moves fom one- to three-carrier pairs, since the Florida resort traffic
has been eliminated and the length of haul effect has been modified.
As was anticipated from the scatter diagram there is no clear-cut sepa-
ration of high and low growth rates. Although lows dominate the one-
carrier insets, there is a scattering of highs including such conspicuous
monopoly pairs as Los Angeles-Pittsburgh, Chicago-Denver, and New
York-Atlanta. On the three-carrier insets, New York-Los Angeles and
Chicago-Los Angeles drop out of the high category (see Figure 2) so
that the lows provide more of a balance to such highs as those on the
Los Angeles map representing traffic between the West Coast, on the
one hand, and Philadelphia or Washington on the other. Certain minor
qualifications should be noted, however. On the one-carrier, Los An-
geles inset, the growth of Los Angeles-Minneapolis traffic may be
associated with the fact that this city pair had been certificated for
single-carrier service by 1954 as opposed to connecting services in 1949.
On the three-carrier, Los Angeles inset, the phenomenal growth of the
Los Angeles-Las Vegas resort traffic may be related to some lesser degree
with competition. In 1949, Western monopolized this traffic; in 1954,.
Western, TWA, and United were effective competitors.
An attempt was made to apply analysis of co-variance to these regres-
sion residuals but with inconclusive results because of the nature of the.
data. 6 Adjustment of the average growth rates to compensate for length
of haul effects resulted in a somewhat more regular progression; 124
per cent for the one-carrier pairs; 146 for the two-carrier pairs; and 152
for the three-carrier pairs excluding Los Angeles-Las Vegas.
16 Analysis of covariance is essentially the application of analysis of variance
to regression residuals. That is, do the means of the one-, two-, and three-carrier
residuals vary significantly between the groups in the light of the amount of varia-
tion among the residuals within each group? It is more complicated because differ-
ences between groups may be associated with the slope of the regression line as
well as with the group means (elevations of the regression lines for each group)
and with group variance. Even with the Los Angeles-Las Vegas route excluded, the
differences in variance between the three groups were too great to permit an evalu-
ation of the difference in means.






Figure 6-Percentage Increase in Air Traffic from March and September,
1954 to March and September, 1956
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Thus, the net result of the examination of 1949-1954 growth is to
indicate the difficulty of isolating possible growth effects of number of
carriers on individual 'routes. No statistically conclusive evidence of a
relationship between growth and number of carriers has been discov-
ered although there are interesting progressions in average growth rates.
Traffic Growth from 1954 to 1956
Figure 6 carries the growth rate analysis into the recent period of
competitive change, 1954-1956. The growth rate for U. S. total pas-
senger miles was considerably less for this shorter period (39 per cent
as compared to 136 per cent). The histogram-legend indicates also that
the frequency distribution of growth rates was somewhat more concen-
trated. The coefficient of variability for the non-resort pairs went from
58 per cent down to 47 per cent. More than half of the New York and
Chicago routes had growth rates between 20 and 40 per cent. The
legend is again arranged with the shaded pattern centered on the mean
(excluding the Florida pairs) and each category is again 1/2 a standard
deviation in width so that the two maps may be effectively compared.
The factors noted on the 1949-54 map continued to affect growth
during the two-year period of competitive change. Resort traffic con-
tinued to grow far more rapidly than other traffic. The Florida resorts
have an average rate of increase of 80 per cent on Figure 6 as compared
to the total growth rate of 39 per cent. The previously observed contrast
between moderately high Florida growth rates on New York and Chi-
cago routes and extremely high rates on newer routes to other Manu-
facturing Belt Centers, is even more marked on Figure 6 where the
Miami-New York.and Miami-Chicago routes now have dropped out of
the highest category. The different nature of Florida air traffic as
compared to other winter resort travel is also more evident on Figure 6,
in the contrast between the high rates of growth on the Miami map
and the low rates of growth for the Arizona resorts (Phoenix and
Tucson) on the New York and Chicago maps.
Statistically, the effects of length of haul seem to bear just about the
same weak relationship to the short-term growth on Figure 6 as to the
longer term growth on Figure 1. The correlation coefficient is .42 as
compared to the previous .40. Map inspection leaves one with the
impression that, although the over-all relationship is about the same,
individual growth rates display a considerably more erratic progression
with distance. This is particularly noticeable on the Chicago map where
low growth rates are recorded at the Texas and Arizona cities, as well
as at the Arizona resorts. There are also a number of high-increase
short-haul city pairs. (On the New York map, note Buffalo, Cleveland,
Dayton, and Louisville; Pittsburgh on the Chicago map; Phoenix and
Denver on the Los Angeles map.) Table 2 presents the variation with
broad distance zones.
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The drop-off in growth in the 1000 to 1500 mile zone is probably
associated with weak growth of Chicago's Texas traffic, as well as New
York's Kansas City and New Orleans traffic. It is interesting to note that
the hauls of greater than 2000 miles now record a sharply increased
growth rate as the West Coast traffic to such Eastern Seaboard centers
as Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington grew quite rapidly, possibly
with the initiation of non-stop services. It is probable, in fact, that these
particular high-growth, long-haul city pairs pulled the correlation
coefficient up to its previous level even though the relationship between
growth and length of haul visually seems less consistent. The 33 Cali-
fornia city pairs still had a somewhat greater average rate of increase
than the total increase (49 as compared to 39 per cent) despite the
apparent effects of the Western Airlines pilot strike on the Los Angeles
and San Francisco traffic to Las Vegas and the Pacific Northwest.
Coach fares are still only weakly related to growth as is indicated
in Table 2 in the appendix. The correlation coefficient of .24 is ob-
tained from simple linear regression. Just as previously, this figure is
significant at the 5 per cent but not at the 1 per cent level. Among the
low coach percentage pairs with high growth rates are New York routes
to Buffalo as well as to Dayton; among the high coach percentages with
low growth rates are both New York and Chicago routes to the Arizona
cities, New York-Atlanta, and Chicago-San Francisco.
Figure 7 shows the growth rates again divided onto three maps
according to the number of competitors. Map inspection indicates no
consistent difference in growth rates between one-, two-, and three-
carrier pairs. On the three-carrier insets there are as many growth rates
in below-average categories as there are in above-average categories;
on the one-carrier insets there are almost as many in above-average
categories as in below-average. This visual impression is supported by
the average growth rates. One-carrier pairs average 40 per cent, actually
slightly higher than two-carrier pairs which averaged 38 per cent, but
less than the 47 per cent recorded for the three-carrier pairs. Analysis of
variance tests indicated that the differences between the three groups
were statistically insignificant-as were differences between both the
one- and three-carrier groups and the two- and three-carrier groups.
The relationship between coach percentages and number of competi-
tors also proved statistically insignificant with averages of 33, 33 and
41 for the one-, two-, and three-carrier pairs respectively. Again, the
5 per cent definition of effective competition was applied and again
both growth rate and coach variations according to competitive group-
ings tested as insignificant.
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Figure 8- Regression of Growth on Length of
Haul, 1954-1956
Figure 8 is the scatter diagram showing the relationship between
.growth and length of haul for the 1954-1956 period, and the residual
deviations from that relationship. There seems to be less tendency for
the one-carrier pairs to cluster below the line and the three-carrier
pairs to cluster above the line than was true in the previous period.
Figure 9, representing the spatial distribution of the residual variations
separated onto maps of one-, two- and three-carrier pairs also indicates
the weakness of this tendency. 17 Although there are very few highs on
the one-carrier insets, there are correspondingly few highs on the three-
carrier insets. Most of the growth rates in excess of what might be
expected from the average relationship between growth and length of
haul are to be found on the two-carrier insets. Interpretation of growth
is again complicated by the fact that a large number of highs seem to
be concentrated on the Los Angeles map independently of competitiive'
characteristics. Also, the increased number of two-carrier pairs left the
one- and three-carrier groups more susceptible to distortion from the
effects of purely institutional factors. Analysis of covariance tests indi-
17 The regression residuals for 1954-1956 are also categorized into groups of
one-half a standard error of estimate so that Figure 9 may be compared with
Figure 5, the 1949-1954 residuals map.
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cared that the differences between the residual variations of the three
groups were not statistically significant. Adjustment of the means to
compensate for distance effects, however, did result in a very weak






Figure 9 - Residual Deviations from a Regression of Growth on Length of
Haul Grouped According to Number of Competitors, 1954-1956
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for one-carrier pairs; 39.4 for two-carrier pairs; 44 for three-carrier
pairs. The net result of the examination of 1954-1956 growth rates,
however, is a failure to uncover indications of a relationship between
rate of growth and number of competitors. If anything, this lack of
relationship is indicated more strongly by the 1954-1956 data, since
there is less contradictory evidence than was true in the 1949-1954 case.
Traffic Growth on the Competitive-Increase Pairs
The next step in evaluating the relationship between growth and
competition among the leading city pairs is to consider separately the
growth rates of those city pairs which have experienced an increase in
competition. Twenty-one of the 75 non-resort pairs were designated as
competitive-increase pairs. Seventeen of these were city pairs on which
an additional competitor had more than doubled its share of the market
to attain a total of ten per cent. The other four include those on which
the additional competitor had more than doubled its share to reach
5 per cent. It should also be noted that competitive increases at nearly
all of these pairs were the result of the 1955-1956 CAB decisions.
Growth rates of the competitive-increase pairs for 1949-1954 and
1954-1956 are presented on Figure 10. The categories used are the
same as in the two growth maps. Since each category represents one-half
a standard deviation the two insets in Figure 10 are comparable in
terms of dispersion from the mean. Preliminary inspection of these
maps suggests that at this point in the investigation signs begin pointing
to a possible relationship between growth and competition. Some of
the city pairs previously cited as having unusually high growth rates
for their distance zone or coach percentage' s are seen to be city pairs
which have experienced competitive increase. In terms of specific
growth rates on the maps it might be noted that the competitive-
increase pairs which grew most rapidly between 1954 and 1956 included
a number involved in the pattern of reciprocal awards whereby TWA
and United Air Lines entered a number of each other's markets19 (New
York to Cleveland and to Denver; Chicago to Pittsburgh; Los Angeles
to Pittsburgh and to Denver); and the New York-Buffalo market where
Capital's Vicker's Viscount has apparently had an unusual impact.20
Analysis of variance was then applied to the difference in growth
rates between the 21 competitive-increase pairs and a control group
consisting of the 54 non-resort pairs which did not experience an
increase in competition. In both cases, the differences tested as insig-
nificant. In the 1949-54 case, the average for the competitive-increase
group was 124 per cent, appreciably lower than the 150 per cent re-
corded for the control group. In the 1954-56 case, however, the average
18 Notably Buffalo and Cleveland on the New York map, Pittsburgh on the
Chicago map, Denver on the Los Angeles map.
19 See Taaffe, op. cit., pages 134 and 138. These compensatory awards are
indicated correctly on the maps although the omission of an entire line from the
text on p. 142 results in a misleading statement with reference to the individual
routes concerned.
20 Taaffe, op. cit., pages 137 and 141.







Figure 10 - Percentage Increases for Competitive-Increase Pairs, 1949-1954
and 1954-1956
for the competitive-increase group was 43.90 per cent, as opposed to
38.57 per cent for the control group. Despite the fact that this differ-
ence in means could not be regarded as statistically significant in the
light of the amount of variation still present within each of these
groups, it is a matter of considerable interest to note how the competi-
tive-increase group had improved its position relative to the control
group. This shows up on the map in the form of the many competitive-
increase city pairs which moved into higher growth-rate categories in
1954-1956. Particularly striking examples are New York-Buffalo, Chi-
cago-Pittsburgh and Los Angeles-Denver, each of which moved up three
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growth-rate categories. Elevenoof the competitive-increase pairs moved
to a higher category while only three moved to a lower category.
Differences in coach fare percentages also tested as insignificant in both
study periods. Here too the average for the competitive-increase group
went from slightly below to slightly above that of the control group.
The differences were not as marked as in the case of growth rates,
however.
Examination of residuals for the 21 competitive-increase pairs led
to similar conclusions. Changes on work maps were so slight in magni-
tude that no presentation map was deemed necessary. This indicates
that differences in growth associated with length of haul do not affect
either: (a) the fact that the average growth rates of the competitive-
increase pairs do not differ in a statistically significant fashion from the
average growth rates of the control group; or (b) the fact that the
average for the competitive-increase pairs has gone from appreciably
below to somewhat above that of the control group.
Summary
On balance, it seems reasonable to say that this examination of the
traffic characteristics of the 99 leading city pairs has not conclusively
demonstrated that there is a relationship between air traffic growth and
airline competition, or between the offering of effective coach services
and airline competition. To this extent the findings are similar
to those of the previous studies. The observation of individual city
pairs on the map and the contradictory implications of some of the
measures, however, leads to considerably more equivocal findings
regarding competition and growth than was true in the other cases.
There has been enough doubt cast on the broad statement above to
warrant the inclusion of several important qualifications. First, al-
though the findings were largely negative for comparisons involving
one-, two-, and three-carrier pairs they had important positive aspects
for competitive-increase pairs. This leads one to postulate a possible
difference between the initial impact of added competition and longer-
term effects. It is possible that a significant amount of new traffic is
generated by the entry of a new carrier but that this effect levels off
after a period of time so that there is no measurable relationship
between rate of growth and number of competitors. Secondly, there is
enough conflicting evidence in the longer term case (particularly
1949-1954) to provide fuel for speculation as to the effects of compe-
tition being temporarily submerged during the periods considered,
when the nation's travel habits were apparently undergoing a large-scale
change. A circumspect conclusion in this regard might be that the
weight of evidence to date points to the difficulty of isolating any
possible relationship between rate of growth and number of competi-
tors. A third qualification to the broad general conclusion is that growth
in air travel is spotty and erratic when observed over individual routes.
This becomes something more than a truism when one considers that
MAP ANALYSIS OF AIRLINE COMPETITION
the CAB must make use of individual routes in implementing its efforts
to promote competition. The contrast in the traffic reaction of different
city pairs to the addition of a carrier is associated with the many insti-
tutional factors evident from the maps. In addition to length of haul
and Florida resort travel, a particular growth rate may be greatly
affected by an individual airline's equipment policy, severe rail com-
petition, unusual travel to such cities as Los Angeles and San Francisco,
service-connected travel, etc. Rather than assume that all these dis-
turbances will neatly cancel out, it seems useful to note the more
conspicuous of these factors in order to attain a suitable degree of
disenchantment with the resulting generalizations-and to be partic-
ularly cautious about taking a few selected city pairs as being typical
exemplifications of competitive or other effects. Then too, certain of
these apparently institutional factors may prove to be of such a nature
as to be susceptible of ultimate systematization thereby refining,
strengthening and quite possibly altering, the generalizations.
Thus, an empirical examination of the 100 leading city pairs has
led to certain broad conclusions regarding the relationship between
airline competition and air traffic. From the first part of the study it
could be concluded that the entry of a new carrier often but not always
accompanied a sizable percentage diversion of traffic. It was also noted
that recent awards have favored the expansion of regional carriers into
Big Four markets. This reduced the disproportionate Big Four share
of the premium markets and created, at least initially, a pattern domi-
nated by two-carrier, effective competition if one were to use the 10
per cent criterion. The latter portion of the study indicated that the
effects of competition in stimulating growth and effective low-fare
service over specific routes must still be considered as unproven,
although some statistically inconclusive evidence did suggest that at
least the initial impact of added competition does produce above-
average growth rates.
The fact that there is considerable evidence of competitive diversion
coupled with the lack of evidence that competition stimulates growth
over individual routes would seem to indicate that the original carriers
have experienced traffic losses with the entry of a new carrier. This, of
course, is not necessarily the case. It is quite possible that the original
carrier may have had its percentage share of the market reduced on a
route with below-average traffic growth and still experienced an abso-
lute increase in passengers carried due to the great increase in over-all
air traffic. It might even be argued that such over-all traffic growth
might have been stimulated by the effects of a generally more competi-
tive airline industry in the form of better services, more national
advertising, accelerated equipment innovation, etc. On the other hand,
it should also be noted that even if an original carrier had gained an
absolute increase over a particular route in the face of increased com-
petition, this might have been accomplished only with a disproportion-
ately great increase in scheduled seats. Thus, a close examination of
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changes in load factors on competitive-increase routes would seem to be
a requisite to an evaluation of the harmful economic effects of added
competition on original carriers. Even with load factor information,
however, many complicating factors would remain, such as a possible
increase in coach percentages, greater promotional expenditure, or
system-wide economic repercussions of diversion of equipment from
other routes. Possible avenues of further investigation might include
the use of more complete data (including schedule and cost estimate
data) 21 which would necessitate more refined analytical tools, or the
use of case studies so as to facilitate detection of the specific means
whereby competitive diversion or unusually rapid growth are brought
about on selected individual routes. 2 Experimentation with other defi-
nitions of competition, and closer examination of the growth character-
istics of competitive-increase pairs over longer periods of time should
also aid continued efforts of investigators to arrive at objective evalua-
tions of the effects of airline competition.
APPENDIX
The following tables represent the data from which the growth maps were made.




Map Category: Red (A growth rate of 241 per
1. Miami-Hartford 732
2. Miami-Philadelphia 544





8. Los Angeles-Dayton 366
9. Miami-Cleveland 350
10. Miami-St. Louis 314
11. Chicago-San Diego 310
12. Los Angeles-Boston 307
13. Miami-Minn.-St. Paul 293
14. Chicago-Phoenix 288
15. New York-San Diego 283
16. Chicago-Miami 280
17. Los Angeles-Philadelphia 279
18. Miami-Cleveland 273
19. Miami-San Francisco 273
20. San Francisco-Washington 269
21. Miami-Columbus 261
22. Miami-Indianapolis 255
23. New York-Dayton 246


























21 For example, the useful data being developed by Samuel B. Richmond in
"Creating Competition Among Airlines," JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE,
XXIV, (Autumn, 1957) pages 435-464, should provide an excellent basis for critical
evaluation of some of the tentative generalizations put forth in this study.
22 Some work of this sort being carried on at the Transportation Center by
George Post and Arthur Hurter on selected routes is producing further insights


















30. Los Angeles-Minn.-St. Paul
31. Los Angeles-Pittsburgh
32. Los Angeles-St. Louis
33. Los Angeles-Miami




37. New York-Los Angeles
38. New York-Tampa


























































































































































































City Pair 1949-1954 1954
85. New York-Pittsburgh 75 22
86. New York-Detroit 71 19
87. Washington-Boston 71 15
88. Los Angeles-Dallas 69 42
89. New York-New Orleans 64 43
90. New York-Milwaukee 62 20
91. Los Angeles-Phoenix 60 23
92. Chicago-Kansas City 55 27
93. New York-Washington 49 10
94. New York-San Antonio 47 41
95. New York-Minn.-St. Paul 46 20
Map Category: Black Dots (less than 40.5 per cent)
96. Miami-Boston 19 60
97. Chicago-Minn.-St. Paul 14 21
98. New York-Boston 11 11







City Pair 1954-1956 1956
Map Category: Red (A growth rate of 64 per cent or more)
1. Miami-Detroit 149 37
2. Tampa-Boston 146 38
3. Miami-Hartford 138 -
4. Miami-Columbus 129 -
5. Miami-Boston 128 60
6. San Francisco-Philadelphia 119 55
7. Los Angeles-Miami 107 36
8. Los Angeles-Philadelphia 102 62
9. Miami-Philadelphia 100 90
10. Miami-Minn.-St. Paul 100 6
11. Miami-Indianapolis 86 46
12. Miami-Buffalo 83 38
13. New York-West Palm Beach 81 31
14. Miami-San Francisco 79 37
15. San Francisco-Boston 74 47
16. Miami-St. Louis 72 66
17. Los Angeles-Washington 71 35
18. Los Angeles-Boston 69 49
19. Los Angeles-Pittsburgh 67 54
20. Miami-Cleveland 67 51
Map Category: Red Lines (55 to 63.5 per cent)
21. Los Angeles-Denver 63 42
22. Miami-Pittsburgh 61 55
23. Los Angeles-Phoenix 61 39
24. New York-Louisville 61 22
25, Chicago-Tampa 58 60
26. Chicago-Pittsburgh 58 20
27. New York-Los Angeles 57 51
Map Category: Red Dots (46 to 54.5 per cent)
28. New York-Portland 52 40
29. Chicago-Boston 52 27
30. San Francisco-Detroit 51 40
31. New York-Dayton 51 9
32. New York-Tampa 50 63
33. Los Angeles-Cleveland 50 38
34. Los Angeles-Houston 50 33
35. Chicago-San Diego 49 68
36. Chicago-Miami 49 68
37. New York-Cleveland 49 22


































































































54. Los Angeles-St. Louis
55. Los Angeles-Detroit
56. New York-Minn.-St. Paul




Map Category: Black Cross-Hatch
61. Los Angeles-Kansas City




66. New York-New Orleans
67. Miami-Washington














Map Category: Black Lines (19 to
82. New York-Atlanta
83. Chicago-Dallas











Map Category: Black Dots (less thl
95. San Francisco-Seattle
96. Los Angeles-Las Vegas
97. Chicago-Houston
98. San Francisco-Portland
99. Chicago-Phoenix
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